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Suing State-Sponsors of Terrorism Under the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: Giving Life to
the Jurisdictional Grant After Cicippio-Puleo
RUTHANNE

M.

DEUTSCH*

I. Introduction
U.S. citizens are frequently, and tragically, the targets of international acts of terrorism.
Without even including the victims of September 11, 2001, or the ongoing bloodshed in
Iraq, approximately 700 Americans have been killed and 1,600 wounded by international
terrorist attacks since 1970.1 In 1996, Congress enacted legislation to allow American citizens harmed by terrorist acts to use the U.S. courts to seek money damages from the
responsible state sponsors of terrorism.2 During the years immediately following its passage,
there was little doubt that this legislation provided both a grant of jurisdiction and a statutory cause of action to allow U.S. victims of terrorism to seek money damages directly
against the foreign state sponsors of terror.'
Proponents of civil suits against state-sponsors of terrorism assert that the war on terrorism can be won in the "orderly confines of the courtroom. ' 4 They argue that civil actions
against terrorist states not only supply an important weapon in the fight against interna-

*Law Clerk to the Honorable Timothy B. Dyk, United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit;J.D.,
summa cum laude, Georgetown University Law Center, 2004; Ph.D. Economics, Yale University, 1994. Thanks
to Vicki C. Jackson, Steven H. Goldblatt, and Elizabeth B. Wydra of Georgetown University Law Center for
their helpful comments. The author was a Student Counsel on Brief for the Georgetown Appellate Litigation
Clinic, appointed by the D.C. Circuit as Amicus Curiae on behalf of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the case
of Ciccipio-Puleov. Islamic Republic ofIran, 353 E3d 1024 (D.C. Cir. 2004). This article was written subsequent
to the ruling in Ciccipio-Puleo,and the views expressed herein are those of the author alone.
1. American Victims of Mid-EastTerrorism, compiled by the American-Israeli Cooperative Enterprise, available
at http://www.us-israel.org/jsource/Ferrorism/usvictims.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2004).
2. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA), Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 22 1(a), 110 Stat. 1214
(Apr. 24, 1996) (codified in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1441(d), 1602-1611).
3. See infra note 15 and accompanying text.
4. Jennifer Senior, A Nation Unto Himself-Intrudersin theHouse of Saud, PartII, N.Y. TiMEs MAG., Mar. 14,
2004, § 6 at 36.
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tional terrorism but also provide redress to injured victims.' Other policy-makers and scholars have warned of the dangers that civil actions brought by private parties against foreign
states can pose to the Executive branch's ability to effectively conduct foreign relations,
particularly in the realm of fighting terrorism where shifting political alliances are common,
negotiations more sensitive, and national security concerns loom large.6
Notwithstanding the potential risks of allowing civil suits against terrorist states, in April
1996, Congress added section 1605(a)(7) to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA)
in order to "give American citizens an important economic and financial weapon against
...outlaw states. ' 7 Despite Executive branch resistance, this amendment to the FSIA was
passed as part of the comprehensive Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996 (AEDPA) in order to provide American citizens and their families the opportunity to
seek money damages against state-sponsors of terrorism.' The plain language of section
1605(a)(7) waives foreign sovereign immunity and provides jurisdiction over suits against
foreign states designated by the Executive branch as state-sponsors of terrorism when U.S.
nationals are injured by the delineated terrorist acts. 9 Specifically, the statute provides:
A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the United States or of
the States in any case ...not otherwise covered by [the commercial activity exception], in
which money damages are sought against a foreign state for personal injury or death that was
caused by an act of torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage taking, or the provision of material support or resources ... for such an act if such act or provision of material
support is engaged in by an official, employee, or agent of such foreign state while acting
within the scope of his or her office, employment, or agency." 0
This paper explores this issue of whether and how this jurisdictional grant for suits by U.S.
citizens against foreign state-sponsors of terrorism can be given its full effect.

5. Hamish Hume & Gordon Dwyer Todd, Ambulance Chasing for Justice: How Private Lawsuitsfor Civil
Damages Can Help CombatInternationalTerror, The Federalist Society, National Security White Papers, available
at http://www.fed-soc.org/PublicationsfFerrorism/ambulancechasing.htm (last visited Nov. 16, 2004).
6. See, e.g., Anne-Marie Slaughter & David Bosco, PlaintiffsDiplomacy, FOREIGN AFF. 102, (Sept/Oct 2000);
Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, A Critique of the Terrorism Exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 34
N.Y.U.J. Ir'L L. & PoL. 887 (2002); Jack L. Goldsmith & Ryan Goodman, U.S. Civil Litigation and International Terrorim, in CIVIL LITIGATION AGAINST TERRORISM (John Norton Moore, ed., forthcoming 2002), at
http://ssm.com/abstract-id = 312451 (last visited Nov. 16, 2004) (Goldsmith & Goodman offer a balanced
view of the costs and benefits of permitting civil actions against international terrorist (state and non-state)
defendants).
7. H.R. REP. No. 104-383, at 62 (1995).
8. See John E Murphy, Civil Liabilityfor the Commission of InternationalCrimes as an Alternative to Criminal
Prosecution, 12 HARV. HuM. RTs. J. 1, 35-36 (1999) (describing the opposition of the U.S. Departments of
Justice and State to the provisions of AEDPA that amended the FSIA.)
9. Foreign states currently designated by the Secretary of State as state sponsors of terrorism are Cuba,
Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria. See 22 C.F.R. § 126.1(d) (2002); 31 C.ER. § 596.201 (2002).
Although Iraq technically remains on the list, President Bush recently exercised authority granted to him by
Congress and has made section 1605(a)(7) inapplicable with respect to Iraq. Presidential Determination No.
2003-23, 39 WEEKLY COMP. PREs.Doc. 559 (May 7, 2003). The effect of this determination on suits against
Iraq was one of the issues raised in Acree v. Republic ofIraq, 370 E3d 41, 43 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
10. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7) (2003). The section goes on to state that "the court shall decline to hear a claim
under this paragraph-(A) if the foreign state was not designated a state sponsor of terrorism under section
6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979... and (B) even if the foreign state is or was so designated, if(i) ...claimant has not afforded the foreign state a reasonable opportunity to arbitrate ...(ii) neither the
claimant nor the victim was a national of the United States ...when the act upon which the claim is based
occurred." Id.
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Five months after section 1605(a)(7) was passed, the same Congress enacted a separate
provision titled Civil Liability for Acts of State Sponsored Terrorism." This provision, more
commonly known as the Flatow Amendment, was codified as a note to section 1605.12 The
Flatow Amendment, by its terms, is narrower than the terrorist-state exception to sovereign
immunity. It confers a federal statutory cause of action that largely echoes the language of
the immunity waiver provided by section 1605(a)(7), with the one glaring exception that
only individual state actors (as opposed to foreign state defendants qua states) are subject
to liability when the substantive standards for jurisdiction are met. 3 The text of the amendment reads, in pertinent part:
An official, employee, or agent of a foreign state designated as a state sponsor of terrorism...
while acting within the scope of his or her office, employment, or agency shall be liable to a
United States national or the national's legal representative for personal injury or death caused
by acts of that official, employee, or agent for which the courts of the United States may
maintain jurisdiction under section 1605(a)(7) ...for money damages which may include economic damages, solaium, pain, and suffering, and punitive damages if the acts were among
4
those described in section 1605(a)(7).'
Since the 104th Congress passed section 1605(a)(7) and the Flatow Amendment in 1996,
federal district courts had consistently read these two provisions in pari materia to allow
U.S. victims of state-sponsored terrorism to bring suit against foreign state defendants (i.e.
the governments of foreign states accused of sponsoring terrorism) in addition to individual
state actors under the federal cause of action created by the Flatow Amendment. 5 In these
suits, punitive damages, which would otherwise be unavailable in actions brought pursuant
to the FSIA, have been awarded against individual state officials and at times were also
awarded against the foreign states themselves through the application of respondeatsuperior
principles.

11. Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1605 (1996).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. (citing Pub. L. 104-208, Div. A, Title I, § 101(c) [Title V,§ 5891, Sept. 30, 1996, 110 Stat. 3009172).
15. See, e.g., Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 E Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1998); Cronin v. Islamic Republic
of Iran, 238 E Supp. 222 (D.D.C. 2002); Regier v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 281 F. Supp. 2d 87 (D.D.C. 2003);
Kilburn v. Republic of Iran, 277 E Supp. 2d 24 (D.D.C. 2003). See also Alejandre v. Republic of Cuba, 996 F
Supp. 1239 (S.D.FL.1997) (applying Flatow cause of action as an enforcement provision to § 1605(a)(7), finding
that proving agent's liability also proves the state's under respondeatsuperiorprinciples); Smith v.Islamic Emirate
of Afghanistan, 262 F. Supp. 2d 217, 228 (S.D.N.Y, 2003) (reviewing the D.C. District Court cases and finding
that "[wlhile not free from doubt, the better view in my opinion is that the Flatow Amendment likely provides
a cause of action against a foreign state."). Note that Cicippio-Puleo
v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 353 E3d 1024
(D.C. Cir. 2004) subsequently held that the Flatow Amendment does not provide a cause of action against
foreign state defendants, thus denying legal effect tolower court decisions in that district that found liability
based on the Flatow Amendment, although leaving open the possibility of liability against foreign states pursuant to some other cause of action (discussed in more detail at notes 17-20, infra).
16. Compare Alejandre, 996 E Supp. at 1239 (finding the Cuban Air Force liable for punitive damages for
extrajudicial killing of U.S. citizens, but Cuba qua state liable only for compensatory damages), with Flatow,
999 F. Supp. at 1 (finding the Republic of Iran liable for
punitive damages for sponsoring extrajudicial killing
of U.S. citizen). A summary of damages awarded in actions pursuant to section 1605(a)(7) isprovided in Kristine
Cordier Karnezis, Annotation, Award of Damages under State-Sponsored Terrorism Erception to Foreign Sovereign
ImmunitiesAct (28 U.S.C.A. § 1605(a)), 182 A.L.R. Fed. 1 (2002) [hereinafter Karnezis].
WINTER 2004

894

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER

Such expansive interpretations of the terrorism amendments to the FSIA were recently
put to a halt by the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals in Cicippio-Puleo v. Islamic Republic of

Iran, when the court held that the 1996 amendments to the FSIA do not create a private
right of action against foreign state defendants.' 7 Specifically, the Cicippio-Puleocourt held:
[Nleither 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7) nor the Flatow Amendment, nor the two considered in tandem, creates a private right of action against a foreign government. Section 1605(a)(7) merely
waives the immunity of a foreign state without creating a cause of action against it, and the
Flatow Amendment only provides a private right of action against officials, employees, and
agents of a foreign state, not against the foreign state itself.'"
Although acknowledging that suits against foreign governments would better further the
statutory purpose of compensating victims for horrific losses (than would personal capacity
suits against individual state officials), the Cicippio-Puleocourt nonetheless found the allowance of such claims to be "a step that Congress has yet to take. And it is for Congress, not
the courts, to decide whether a cause of action should lie against foreign states."' 9 While
denying the existence of a statutory cause of action, Cicippio-Puleo expressly left open the
question of what alternative grounds-beyond those contained in the 1996 amendments
to the FSIA-might still be available to bring claims against foreign state defendants pursuant to the jurisdictional grant provided by section 1605(a)(7). In an unusual posture, the
D.C. Circuit affirmed the district court's sua sponte dismissal for the plaintiff's failure to
state a claim against foreign state defendants under the Flatow Amendment, yet simultaneously remanded, holding that plaintiffs "were entitled to remand so that they would have
opportunity to amend their complaint to state a cause of action under some other source
20
of law, including state law."
The court did not offer such a reprieve to the plaintiffs in Acree v. Republic of Iraq, where
the D.C. Circuit relied on their finding in Cicippio-Puleoto deny recovery to seventeen U.S.
soldiers held as prisoners of war by the Iraqi Government while serving in the Gulf War
in early 1991.2 1 The Acree court found that the appellees failed to offer "any other coherent
alternative causes of action" (other than the Flatow Amendment) to give effect to the jurisdictional grant provided in section 1605(a)(7), and accordingly vacated the judgment
below and dismissed the lawsuit.2 The D.C. Circuit further clarified their position that a
plaintiff proceeding under the terrorism exception to the FSIA against foreign states, qua
states, must "identify a particular cause of action arising out of a specific source of law" and
that "generic common law cannot be the source of a federal cause of action."23

17. Cicippio-Puleo,353 E3d at 1024.
18. Id. at 1033.
19. Id. at 1036.
20. Id. at 1025. The court went on to clarify: "In remanding, we do not mean to suggest, one way or the
other, whether plaintiffs have a viable cause of action. The possibility that an alternative source of law might
support such a claim was addressed only by amici, and we do not ordinarily decide issues not raised by parties."
Id. at 1036. The court was willing, however, to decide that the Flatow Amendment cause of action was limited
to personal capacity suits against state actors, even though that issue was not briefed by the parties, but only
by the United States as amicus curiae. Id. at 1034.
21. Acree v. Republic of Iraq, 370 E3d 41, 43 (D.C. Cir. 2004) ("Our recent decision in Cicippio-Puleo...
makes it plain that the terrorism exception to the FSIA is merely a jurisdictional provision and does not provide
a cause of action against foreign states.") (internal citations omitted).
22. Id.
23. Id. at 59 (emphasis in original).
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This paper evaluates the availability and appropriateness of other sources of law that
might give rise to claims for money damages for Americans injured by state-sponsored
terrorism and entitled to jurisdiction against foreign state defendants when the substantive
requirements of the state-sponsored terrorism exception to the FSIA are met. Following
this introduction, Part II explores the legislative history and debate surrounding the passage
of section 1605(a)(7) and the Flatow Amendment, establishing that the Flatow Amendment
cannot be read to limit, or impliedly repeal, the jurisdictional grant of section 1605(a)(7).
To the contrary, it is readily demonstrated that the Flatow Amendment was passed in order
to expand, rather than contract, the scope of potential remedies available to U.S. citizens
injured by state-sponsored terrorist acts.2 4 Accordingly, even if the Flatow Amendment is
narrowly construed to create a private right of action only for personal capacity claims
against individual state officials, the grant of jurisdiction provided by section 1605(a)(7)
against foreign state defendants qua states survives and opens the door to U.S. courts for
other claims.
Part I examines the potential sources of law that can be contemplated under the surviving jurisdictional grant of section 1605(a)(7). The case is first made for the existence of
a federal statutory claim embodied in the text of the jurisdictional provision itself, an alternative cursorily rejected by the Cicippio-Puleocourt, but, as I argue, one worthy of further
explanation. Alternatively, the argument is made that common law claims sounding in tort
may be brought pursuant to section 1605(a)(7). Options under the common law include
state tort law, customary international law, and federal common law. I evaluate the arguments for and against each of these sources of common law, as well as the relationship
between them. Drawing in part upon the Supreme Court's recent decision in Sosa v.
Alvarez-Machain,25 I conclude that federal common law, incorporating principles of both
state tort law and international law, is the most appropriate choice of law for civil suits
brought against state-sponsors of terrorism pursuant to section 1605(a)(7). I further argue
that the need for uniformity in these actions against foreign state defendants strengthens
the case for federal law (either statutory or common) over state law claims.
Part IV concludes with some observations regarding the responsibility of the judicial
branch to give full effect to the jurisdictional grant provided in section 1605(a)(7), a valid
federal law enacted subject to the article I bicameral and presentment requirements. 6 While
there are strong foreign policy arguments as to why such suits might not be desirable, there
are equally valid policy arguments favoring such litigation. I argue that it is not within the
province of the federal judiciary to unilaterally circumscribe jurisdiction that has been validly conferred by Congress within the bounds of the Constitution.27 If the Executive branch
wishes to repeal section 1605(a)(7), it should be done through transparent legislative process
in a politically accountable fashion and not through piecemeal attack in the courts.

24. See infra notes 67-76 and accompanying text.
25. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S.Ct. 2739 (2004).
26. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 7, cl. 2 ("Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the
Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the President of the United States.").
27. Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 829 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("the day
has yet arrived when this Court may trim a statute solely because it thinks that Congress made it too broad."),
citing Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 6 (Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821) (Marshall, CJ.) ("It is most true that this Court
will not take jurisdiction if it should not: but it is equally true, that it must take jurisdiction if it should... We
have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given.").

WINTER 2004

896

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER

II. The 1996 State-Sponsored Terrorism Amendments to
the FSIA
Originally enacted in 1976, the FSIA provides the sole basis for obtaining jurisdiction
over foreign sovereigns in the courts of the United States"8 and must be applied in every
action involving a foreign state defendant2 9 Section 1604 of the FSIA sets forth a general
presumption of foreign sovereign immunity, under which federal and state courts are barred
from exercising jurisdiction over foreign states except as provided in the enumerated exceptions to immunity contained in sections 1605 to 1607.1 0 Thus, unless a matter falls within
one of the enumerated exceptions to foreign sovereign immunity, jurisdiction over foreign
sovereigns does not lie in the courts of the United States." Exceptions to foreign sovereign
immunity that are commonly invoked under the FSIA include instances when "the foreign
state has waived its immunity either explicitly or by implication,"32 cases in which "the
action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in the United States by the foreign
state,"" and suits against a foreign state for "personal injury or death, or damage to or loss
of property, occurring in the United States and caused by the tortious act or omission of
that foreign state or any official or employee of that foreign state while acting within the
34
scope of his office or employment.
The FSIA is unique in that these and the other enumerated exceptions collapse the three
normally separate inquiries regarding subject matter jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction, and
abrogation of foreign sovereign immunity, into one.3" When the substantive requirements
of any of the act's enumerated exceptions to the general presumption of sovereign immunity
are met, the defense of foreign sovereign immunity is vitiated, and the courts (state and
36
federal) of the United States have both subject matter and personal jurisdiction. As interpreted by the Supreme Court in Verlinden and reaffirmed in the Court's recent decision in

Altmann, the FSIA is more than a mere grant of jurisdiction, but also a "comprehensive

28. Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 434 (1989) (denying jurisdiction
under the Alien Tort Statute to Liberian corporations whose oil tanker was bombed by the Argentine military
during the Falkland Islands war because the FSIA provided the sole basis for obtaining jurisdiction over a
foreign state and there was no applicable exception to immunity covering the bombing at issue). 20 U.S.C.
§ 1602 (2000).
29. Verlinden B.V v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 489 (1983); 28 U.S.C. § 1330 (2003).
30. Amerada Hess Shipping Carp., 488 U.S. at 433.
31. See Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 355 (1993); see also Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 124 S.Ct.
2240, 2249 (2004) (-the Act carves out certain exceptions to its general grant of immunity ... [which] are
central to the Act's functioning.").
32. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1) (2003).
33. Id. § 1605(a)(2).
34. Id. § 1605(a)(5).
35. Daliberti v.Republic of Iran, 97 E Supp. 2d 38, 53 (D.D.C. 2000) (citing the legislative historydescribing
the Act's personal jurisdiction provisions as "in effect, a Federal long-arm statute over foreign states") (citing
H.R. Rep. No. 94-1487, at 13-14 (1976) (footnotes omitted), reprintedin 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6612).
36. Verlinden B.V v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 489-90 ("The Act expressly provides that its
standards control in 'the courts of the United States and of the States,' [28 U.S.C. § 1604], and thus clearly
contemplates that suits may be brought in either federal or state courts. However, '[iln view of the potential
sensitivity of actions against foreign states and the importance of developing a uniform body of law in this
area,' H.R. Rep. No. 94-1487, at 32, the Act guarantees foreign states the right to remove any civil action from
a state court to a federal court. [28 U.S.C. § 1441(d)].... The statute grants jurisdiction over 'any non-jury
civil action against a foreign state ... with respect to which the foreign state is not entitled to immunity,' 28
U.S. C. § 1330(a).").

VOL. 38, NO. 4

SUING STATE-SPONSORS OF TERRORISM UNDER FSIA

897

regulatory statute" that allows "arising-under" jurisdiction because of the substantive standards it provides to determine the conditions under which foreign sovereign immunity is
waived."
As originally enacted, the FSIA primarily served to codify the "restrictive" theory of
foreign sovereign immunity, or the view that foreign states could be sued in the courts of
the United States for their commercial acts, but not for their public acts. 38 Thus, prior to
the 1996 passage of the state-sponsored terrorism provisions, U.S. citizens injured by statesponsored acts of terrorism were unable to obtain jurisdiction over the responsible foreign
states, despite attempts by plaintiffs to squeeze such claims into the existing exceptions to
immunity then-contained in the FSIA1 9 As observed in one of the earliest opinions to
interpret the 1996 amendments to the FSIA, prior to their passage:
Courts steadfastly refused to extend the FSIA as originally enacted beyond commercial activities, jure gestionis, to reach public acts, jure imperii, outside the United States. This judicial
restraint permitted foreign states to use the FSIA as a shield against civil liability
for violations
4°
of the law of nations committed against United States nationals overseas.
The passage of the 1996 amendments to the FSIA transformed the statute. A law that
had previously shielded foreign state defendants from civil liability, despite their clear violations of international law, became, in certain carefully defined circumstances, "an imoutlaw states." 4 1
portant economic and financial weapon [for U.S. citizens to use against] ...
A.

THE PASSAGE OF SECTION

1605(a)(7):

THE STATE-SPONSORED TERRORISM EXCEPTION

In April 1996, Congress passed the state-sponsored terrorism exception, section 1605(a)(7),
as one of many anti-terrorism tools included in the omnibus anti-terrorism legislation
known as the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), a comprehensive
legislative scheme designed to protect national security.42 As noted in the legislative history,
many of the terrorist acts that gave rise to the law were supported, or carried out, by foreign
states and their agents. Congress aimed to reduce the threat of terrorism, a threat "far

37. Id. at 497; see also Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 124 S.Ct. at 2240 (holding FSIA is sui generis and
defies categorization as either purely substantive or purely procedural).
38. Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 488; 28 U.S.C. § 1602. Indeed, in the FSIA's section 1602, sub-titled Findings
and Declaration of Purpose, the statute reflected the statute's codification of international law principles,
expressly stating that "[u]nder international law, states are not inmmne from the jurisdiction of foreign courts
insofar as their commercial activities are concerned."
39. See, e.g., Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349 (1993) (rejecting U.S. citizen's claim that there was a
sufficient nexus between commercial activities and torture in Saudi Arabia to provide jurisdiction under section
1605(a)(2) (the "commercial activities" exception of the FSIA); Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 26 E3d
116 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (finding no applicable grant of jurisdiction under FSIA for American citizen who survived
Holocaust to seek money damages against Germany for injuries suffered and slave labor performed while in
Nazi concentration camps, over the dissent of Judge Wald that section 1605(a)(1) of the FSIA should be
construed to include an implied waiver of immunity if a foreign state breaches ajus cogens norm (at 1183));
Smith v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 886 E Supp. 306 (finding no applicable FSIA exception
for victims of Lockerbie bombing to use against Libya, including domestic tort exception section 1605(a)(5)
(on the argument that bombing occurred in U.S. aircraft), or waiver of immunity exception under section
1605(a)(1) (through breach of United Nations agreements or violation ofjus csgens norms)).
40. Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 E Supp. 1, 11 (D.D.C. 1998).
41. H.R. REP. No. 104-383, at 62 (1995).
42. Section 1605(a)(7) is set forth at § 22 1(a) of AEDPA, Pub. L. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996).
WINTER 2004
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eclipsing the dangers posed by population growth or pollution," by, among other means,
encouraging the President to "increase the international isolation of state sponsors of in43
ternational terrorism."
After chronicling many instances of terrorism sponsored by foreign states, including
those terrorist acts for which the FSIA had previously shielded foreign states from civil
liability in U.S. courts,44 Congress observed that the existence of state sponsors ofterrorism,
or "outlaw states," was "well documented," and that such states "consider terrorism a legitimate instrument of achieving their foreign policy goals. ' '45 The House Committee reviewing the legislation concluded that "allowing suits in the federal courts against countries
responsible for terrorist acts where Americans and/or their loved ones suffer injury or death
at the hands of the terrorist states is warranted." '
Thus, in adding section 1605(a)(7) to the FSIA and thereby providing an explicit exception to foreign sovereign immunity for state-sponsored terrorism, Congress removed the
jurisdictional bar that had previously protected state-sponsors of terrorism from civil liability for the injuries they caused to U.S. citizens and their families. Congress' drafting of
section 1605(a)(7), however, was restrained, reflecting the "delicate legislative compromise"
' 7'
and the "consistent resistance of the Executive branch to the passage of the legislation. 1
First, Congress provided an Executive check on the exercise of jurisdiction over such claims,
limiting the scope of section 1605(a)(7) to allow suits against only those foreign states
designated by the Department of State as state sponsors of terrorism. 4s State Department
designation of countries that repeatedly support international terrorism is governed by the
Export Administration Act, which imposes four categories of government sanctions that go
well beyond the grant of jurisdiction for U.S. victims seeking money damages against terrorist states. 49 This wider application of the designation of a state as a sponsor of terrorism
under the Export Administration Act in areas such as trade policy ensures that the Executive
branch does not manipulate such designations with the sole goal of determining the outcome of specific litigations, 5 thus avoiding article M problems."I

43. H.R. REP. No. 104-518, at 43-44 (1996).
44. Including "the bombing of a German discotheque killing American military personnel; the bombing of
the U.S. Embassy in Beirut; the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103; [and] the hostage takings of Americans in the
Middle East."
45. H.R. REP. No. 104-383, at 62 (1995).
46. Id. The Committee went on to observe that Section 1605(a)(7) would "give American citizens an important economic and financial weapon against these outlaw states."
47. Price v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 294 E3d 82, 89 (D.C. Cir. 2002) ("While such
legislation [to
compensate victims of terrorism and punish responsible foreign states] had long been sought by
victims' groups, it had been consistently resisted by the executive branch.... Section 1605(a)(7) [thus] has some
notable features which reveal the delicate legislative compromise out of which it was born").
48. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7)(A) (2003); see also supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
49. These sanctions include: a ban on arms-related exports and sales, controls over exports of dual use items,
prohibitions on economic assistance, and imposition of miscellaneous financial and other restrictions (including
harsher financial and tax treatment, and the waiver of sovereign immunity in suits brought victims of terrorism).
See generally, U.S. Dep't of State, Patternsof Global Terrorism (Apr. 30, 2003), availableat http://www.state.gov/
s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2002/html/19988.htm.
50. Cf United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. 128 (1871).
51. However, article 11concerns may be implicated to the extent that Congress' imposition of the threat of
civil liability on foreign states for extra-territorial public acts is seen as unduly hampering the Executive branch's
latitude in exercising foreign policy decisions made pursuant to the goals of the Export Administration Act.
Specifically, attachment of a jurisdictional consequence to the State Department's designation of a state as a
VOL. 38, NO. 4
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A second constraint imposed by Congress on the exercise of jurisdiction under section
1605(a)(7) is that only U.S. nationals may sue foreign state sponsors of terrorism if they or
their family members are injured or killed by state-sponsored acts of terrorism.52 Thus,
non-U.S. nationals injured by state-sponsored terrorism have no recourse against the responsible foreign governments in the courts of the United States, as the FSIA is the sole
means for obtaining jurisdiction over foreign states." Finally, Congress limited jurisdiction
over suits against foreign states to those seeking money damages for death or injury caused
by a designated set of terrorist acts, specifically contemplating the same universally criminal
ventures of torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, and hostage-taking that had previously eluded the reach of the jurisdictional grants contained in the original version of the
FSIA.14 These limitations on the class of eligible parties to sue and be sued, as well as the
limited set of state violations that trigger liability, help insure that the exercise of jurisdiction
over the extraterritorial acts of foreign states is within the bounds of international law."
Moreover, as noted by Justice Breyer in his concurring opinion in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,
"recognition of universal jurisdiction in respect to a limited set of norms is consistent with
principles of international comity," and given the tendency of the courts of many nations
to combine civil and criminal proceedings, "universal criminal jurisdiction necessarily con' 56
templates a significant degree of civil tort recovery as well.
The jurisdictional grant of section 1605(a)(7) is further bounded in that only a subset of
the plaintiffs injured by foreign states in violation of international law that had previously
been barred from the U.S. courts by the FSIA are provided access to the courts of the
United States.17 Section 1605(a)(7) is not an open invitation to every party ever injured by

state sponsor of terrorism-a jurisdictional consequence that itself may not fully supported by the Executive
branch-could hamper the willingness or effectiveness of the Executive branch in utilizing this foreign policy
tool. These article H1
concerns are outside the scope of this paper, although recent policy research suggests that
sanctions against terrorist states are often ineffective tools of statecraft. See generally Meghan L. O'Sullivan,
SHREWD SANCTIONS: STATECRAFT AND STATE SPONSORS OF TERRORISM (2003).
52. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7)(B)(ii) (2003).
53. Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 434 (1989).
54. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7); see Cicippio v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21413, at *5
(D.D.C. Mar. 13, 1993), aff'd, 30 E3d 164 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (concluding that "state-supported kidnapping,
hostage-taking, and similar universally criminal ventures were simply not the sort of proprietary enterprises
within the contemplation of Congress when it enacted the 'commercial activity' exception to [the] FSIA."); see
also supra note 39 and accompanying text.
55. International law recognizes five principles for exercising prescriptive jurisdiction. See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402 (1987). The most common is the territorial principle, conferring
jurisdiction over acts within a state's territory (objective territorial) or having effects within its territory (subjective territorial). Other relevant jurisdictional categories include the protective principle, allowing a state to
assert jurisdiction over acts occurring outside its territory which threaten its security, the passive personality
jurisdiction, applicable to jurisdiction over "non-nationals for crimes committed against its nationals outside
of its territory, at least where the state has a particularly strong interest," (recognized in United States v. Fawaz
Yins, 924 E2d 1086, 1091) (D.C. Cit. 1991) and the universality principle, which recognizes thatsome offenses
are so serious that they are subject to the jurisdiction of all states. Limiting the plaintiff class to US nationals
confers protective and passive personality jurisdiction; limiting the terrorist acts to a subset of international law
violations that are recognized asjus cogens confers universal jurisdiction. See generally David Mackusick, Human
Rights vs. Sovereign Rights: The State Sponsored Terrorism Eception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 10
EMORY INT'L L. REV. 741, 756-763, nn. 113-161 (1996).
56. Sosa v. Alvarez Machain, 124 S.Ct. 2739, 2783 (2004) (BreyerJ., concurring).
57. For example, the plaintiffs in both Saudia Arabia v. Nelson and Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany
(discussed supra note 39) would still be barred from bringing suit under section 1605(a)(7) as neither Saudi
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a foreign state from any violation of international law to seek redress in the courts of the
United States." Rather, the statute is a narrowly tailored measure that provides a limited
plaintiff class with the opportunity to pursue claims against a designated set of statesponsors of terrorism only when their injuries have been caused by well-defined actions
that are widely accepted as violations of international norms.5 9
6
Nonetheless, the Executive branch strongly resisted the passage of section 1605(a)(7). 0
Testifying in Senate hearings, a representative from the State Department expressed concerns that section 1605(a)(7) deviated from established international practice, arguing that
expansion of jurisdiction under the FSIA "in ways that cause other states to question our
statute ... could undermine the broad participation we seek [in our judicial system]." '61
Despite this Executive branch opposition, the legislation was passed. 62 Five months later,
however, the same Congress passed the Flatow Amendment, which created a private right
of action against state officials, agents, and employees when the jurisdictional requirements
of section 1605 (a)(7) were satisfied. In addition, the Flatow Amendment expanded the scope
of available damages under the FSIA to allow punitive damages to be awarded for such
actions.

Arabia nor the German Republic are designated state-sponsors of terrorism. Murphy, supra note 8, at 51, nn.
302-303, notes that "[a]lthough attorneys for (Scott] Nelson [the plaintiff in Saudi Arabia v. Nelson] urged
Congress to amend the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act so as to provide redress to Nelson and other persons
similarly situated, this has not been done ... [and that Nelson's attorneys argued that] 'there is no principled
reason'" for distinguishing Nelson's case from those of plaintiffs that have been tortured by states designated
as state sponsors of terrorism. Similarly, foreign nationals may not bring claims against foreign states under
section 1605(a)(7), as distinct from the other exceptions to sovereign immunity of the FSIA. Verlinden B. V v.
Central Bank of Nigeria specifically held that "[tlhe [Foreign Sovereign Immunities] Act contains no indication
of any limitation based on the citizenship of the plaintiff." Verlinden, 461 U.S. 480, 490 (1983).
58. As contrasted with the grant of universal jurisdiction briefly provided by Belgium over extraterritorial
human rights violations between 1993-2003, whose short-lived history is analyzed in Steven R. Rater, Belgium's War Crimes Statute: A Postmortem, 97 AMER. J. I'fr'L. L. 888 (2003). Compare also the open-ended grant
of jurisdiction provided in the Alien Tort Statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1350, providing district courts with "original
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations...
and discussed at length in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S.Ct. 2739 (2004).
59. See e.g., Anti-Terrorism Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2331 et. seq. (2001); Hague Convention for the Suppression
of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Dec. 16, 1970,22 U.S.T 1641 (1970); and United Nations ConventionAgainst
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, and Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 23 I.L.M. 1027
(1984), as modified 24 I.L.M. 535 (1985).
60. Price v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 294 F.3d 82, 89 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
61. Murphy, supra note 8, at 37-38, n. 233 (citing Foreign Terrorismand U.S. Courts Hearingon S.825 Before
the Subcomm. on Courts and Admin. Practice ofthe S. Comm. on the Judiciary,103d Cong. 12-15 (1994) (statement
of Jamison S. Borek, Deputy Legal Adviser, Department of State)).
62. Nonetheless, as discussed further infra at Part IV, the Executive branch has continued to pursue its
opposition to the application of section 1605(a)(7) and the subsequent Flatow Amendment in the courts, arguing
that "the imposition of liability for acts of state sponsored terrorism is an area of law with serious ramifications
for the United States Government's conduct of foreign affairs" and has consistently urged the judiciary to
narrowly construe the 1996 amendments to the FSIA and opposed the enforcement of judgments. Brief for
the United States as amicus curiae at 4; Cicippio-Puleo v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 353 F.3d 1024 (D.C. Cir.
2004); see also Carol D. Leonnig, POWs Not Entitled to IraqiFunds, Justice Says; Persian Gulf Vets Seek Payment
That U.S. Wants to Go TowardRebuilding Iraq, WASH. POST, Apr. 8, 2004, at A8.
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THE PASSAGE OF THE FLATOW AMENDMENT AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO
SECTION

1605(a)(7)

The Flatow Amendment, formally tided Civil Liability for Acts of State Sponsored Terrorism, was passed as part of an appropriations bill and codified as a note to section 1605
of the FSIA. 6 Given the Flatow Amendment's enactment under omnibus appropriations
legislation, there are limited sources available from which to discern the Congressional
intent behind its passage. However, there is no indication that the statute was designed to
limit in any way, much less repeal by implication, the full scope of the grant of jurisdiction
against foreign state defendants provided by section 1605(a)(7). 64 While the Flatow Amendment certainly modifies section 1605(a)(7) by specifying the type of damages available
against individual state officials, 65 the language and limited legislative history of the amendment suggest that such modification was meant to expand the scope of damages available
in actions against state officials by allowing punitive damages that otherwise would be unavailable under the FSIA."6
The circumstances of the Flatow Amendment's passage resulted in a scant two sentences
of legislative history: "The conference agreement inserts language expanding the scope of
monetary damage awards available to American victims of international terrorism. The
67
conferees intend that this section shall apply to cases pending upon enactment of this Act."
This language, brief as it is, demonstrates that the Flatow Amendment was enacted to
expand, not contract, the scope of damages available to plaintiffs under claims brought
pursuant to section 1605(a)(7). Statements made by Congressman Saxton, the sponsor of
the Flatow Amendment and then-Chairman of the House Tax Force on Counterterrorism
and Unconventional Warfare, lend further credence to the view that the Flatow Amends
ment was passed "to make the availability of punitive damages undisputable."6
According to Congressman Saxton, punitive damages were provided under the Flatow
Amendment because "compensatory damages for wrongful death cannot approach a measure of damages reasonably required for a foreign state to take notice."69 The Flatow
Amendment was thus meant to further the original purpose behind the state-sponsored

63. Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 589, 110 Stat. 3009, 3172 (1996)
(codified at 28 U.S.C.A. § 1605 note (2002). Section 1605 of the FSIA, sub-tided General Exceptions to the
JurisdictionalImmunity of a Foreign State, includes all the enumerated exceptions under which "a foreign state
shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the United States or of the States," including section
1605(a)(7), the state sponsored terrorism section.
64. The Flatow Amendment is formally an independent pronouncement of law. Under traditional principles
of statutory construction, as it effects a substantial change to 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7) it can appropriately be
construed as an implied amendment. See Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 E Supp. 1, 12-13 ("An implied
amendment is an act which purports to be independent, but which in substance alters, modifies, or adds to a
prior act.") (quoting Norman J. Singer, LA SUTHERLAND ON STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 22.12 (5th ed. 1992
& Supp. 1997).
65. See supra notes 11-14 and accompanying text.
66. 28 U.S.C. § 1606 (2002) specifically provides that for "any claim for relief with respect to which a foreign
state is not entitled to immunity under section 1605 or 1607 of this chapter, the foreign state shall be liable in
the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances; but a foreign state
except for an agency or instrumentality thereof shall not be liable for punitive damages."
67. H.R. CONF. REp. No. 104-863, at 987 (1996).
68. Flatow, 999 F. Supp. at 25 (citing CongressmanJim Saxton, News Release, Saxton to the FlatowAmendment Family: "Be Strong, America is Behind You," Feb. 26, 1997.
69. Id.
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terrorism exception, "to alter the conduct of foreign states" by imposing "massive civil
liability on foreign state sponsors of terrorism whose conduct results in the death or personal injury of U.S. citizens."70 Moreover, the text of the Flatow Amendment itself reflects
that the statute in no way displaces or repeals other causes of action, as the provisions
regarding application of the statute of limitations and discovery expressly apply not only to
claims bought pursuant to the Flatow Amendment, but also to other claims brought pur71
suant to section 1605(a)(7).
Subsequent legislative enactments further support the view that Congressional intent
behind the passage of the Flatow Amendment was not to limit the scope of jurisdiction
under section 1605(a)(7) to individual official defendants, but rather to expand the scope of
damages available to U.S. victims of state-sponsored terrorism. In 1998, Congress amended
section 1606 of the FSIA to allow punitive damages to be awarded against foreign states in
actions brought pursuant to the jurisdictional grant of section 1605(a)(7)." Although this
allowance of punitive damages against foreign state defendants remained on the books for
only a brief two-year window,"3 Congressional authorization to award punitive damages
against foreign state defendants suggests that Congress did contemplate suits being brought
pursuant to section 1605(a)(7) against foreign governments, and that the full grant of jurisdiction under section 1605(a)(7) against foreign state defendants was meant to be sustained after the enactment of the Flatow Amendment.
In summary, all available evidence suggests that the state-sponsored terrorism exception's
grant of jurisdiction against foreign state defendants survives the passage of the Flatow
Amendment. The Flatow Amendment's legislative history demonstrates that it was meant
to expand, rather than contract, the scope of damages available to plaintiffs who bring
actions pursuant to section 1605(a)(7).1 4 The language of the statute demonstrates that
actions other than those brought pursuant to the Flatow Amendment cause of action are
available."5 Subsequent Congressional enactments support the view that Congress intended6
jurisdiction to lie against foreign state defendants and not just individual state officials.7
Moreover, under the canons of statutory construction, there is a general rule disfavoring
repeals by implication, a rule that applies with special force when the second provision is
enacted as part of an appropriations bill." These arguments demonstrate that the Flatow
70. Id.
71. Subsection (b) reads: Provisions related to statute of limitations and limitations on discovery that would
apply to an action brought under 28 U.S.C. 1605(f) and (g) shall also apply to actions brought under this section
... 28 U.S.C. § 1605 note. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605(f) and (g) are expressly applicable to actions brought pursuant
to § 1605(a)(7). See § 1605 (emphasis added).
72. 28 U.S.C. § 1606 (2002) currently states "As to any claim for relief with respect to which a foreign state
is not entitled to immunity under section 1605 or 1607 of this chapter, the foreign state shall be liable in the
same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances; but a foreign state except
for an agency or instrumentality thereof shall not be liable for punitive damages." In 1998, Congress briefly
amended § 1606 to allow punitive damages against foreign state defendants, for claims brought pursuant to
§ 1605(a)(7), inserting the words "except any action under section 1605(a)(7) or 1610(f)" after "punitive damages" in the text of 28 U.S.C. § 1606. Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations
Act, Pub. L. No. 105-277, Sec. 117(b), § 1606, 112 Stat. 2681 (1998). (emphasis added)
73. Id., repeatedby Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. 106-386, § 2002(f)(2),
114 Stat. 1464 (2002).
74. See supra note 67-71 and accompanying text.
75. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
76. See supra note 72-73 and accompanying text.
77. 73 Am. JuR. 2D STATsrrES § 279 (2004) (citing U.S. v.Will, 449 U.S. 200 (1980)).
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Amendment was in no way intended to narrow the original grant of jurisdiction provided
by section 1605(a)(7). Hence, even if the cause of action provided by the Flatow Amendment
is construed to allow only personal capacity actions against foreign state officials, jurisdiction against foreign state defendants is still available under section 1605(a)(7) when appropriate claims are brought. The next section explores the alternative sources of law under
which plaintiffs may seek money damages against foreign state defendants pursuant to the
jurisdictional grant of section 1605(a)(7).

1I. Potential Causes of Action Against State-Sponsors of
Terrorism
Determining liability under the FSIA involves a two-step inquiry. First, plaintiffs must
satisfy the jurisdictional prerequisite by establishing that the conditions of one of the relevant exceptions to foreign sovereign immunity are met. Second, liability must be proven
for the specific relief that is sought-e.g. a breach of contract under the commercial activity
exception, negligence for an auto accident under the domestic tort exception, etc. Section
1606 of the FSIA reflects this two-step inquiry, providing that "[a]s to any claim for relief
with respect to which a foreign state is not entitled to immunity under section 1605 or 1607
of this chapter, the foreign state shall be liable in the same manner and to the same extent
as a private individual under like circumstances.""'
Prior to the enactment of the state-sponsored terrorism exception, U.S. courts "interpreted this mandate to mean that the forum state's law of liability shall determine the
liability of a foreign state" under the traditional exceptions to foreign sovereign immunity
then codified in the FSIA.7 9 In general, this interpretation meant that courts applied state
common law to determine the nature of foreign state liability when any of the exceptions
to foreign sovereign immunity were met. 0 However, circumstances did arise where courts
applied federal common law as a threshold inquiry-not to rule upon the final liability of
a foreign state regarding the claim at issue, but to determine whether or not the jurisdictional prerequisites of the FSIA exception at issue were met.8 ' For example, in questions
such as the attribution of liability to a foreign state for the actions of one of its agents,

where jurisdiction under the FSIA hinged upon whether or not the agent had the authority
to contract for the foreign state, courts applied federal common law in addressing the
threshold jurisdictional inquiry1s Thus, although the general rule was that the FSIA was
construed neutrally with respect to the rules of substantive liability affecting foreign states,

78. 28 U.S.C. § 1606 (2002).
79. Sandra Engle, Note, Choosing Law for
Attributing Liability Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: A
Proposalfor Uniformity, 15 FoRn Hcu I.r'L L.J. 1060, 1074 (1992).
80. In FirstNationalCity Bank v.Banco para el Comercio Exteriorde Cuba,JusticeO'Connor noted the identical
language between section 1606 and the similar provision in the Federal Tort Claims Act, interpreting such
language to mean that "where state law provides a rule of liabilitygoverning private individuals,the FSIA requires
the application of that rule to foreign states in like circumstances." 462 U.S. 611,622 (1983) (emphasis added);
see also infra note 112 and accompanying text.
81. As observed by the Supreme Court in Verlinden B. V v. Central Bank of Nigeria, when Congress enacted
the FSIA, it expressly acknowledged "the importance of developing a uniform body of law." 461 U.S. 480,489
(internal citations omitted).
82. "For example, if an agent did not have the authority to contract on behalf of the principal foreign state,
the court had no subject matter or personal jurisdiction over the foreign state
under the [commercial activity
exception to] the FSIA." Engle, supra note 79, at 1076.
WINTER 2004

904

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER

occasions did arise where courts nonetheless used federal common law to determine if
jurisdiction lay under the FSIA. Furthermore, courts sometimes applied federal common
law instead of state law in determining the choice-of-law rule when identifying the standard
of substantive liability for foreign states.8 3
In this section, I first argue that the jurisdictional prerequisites to abrogate the defense
of foreign sovereign immunity, embodied in the state-sponsored terrorism exception of
section 1605(a)(7), themselves provide a substantive rule of liability. As distinct from the
other exceptions to foreign sovereign immunity contained within the FSIA, under section
1605(a)(7) a plaintiff must essentially establish his or her prima facie case for tort liability
simply to meet the threshold jurisdictional requirement. 4 In effect, the normal two-step
process of first obtaining jurisdiction and then determining liability under the FSIA, reflected in section 1606, is collapsed into one inquiry under the state-sponsored terrorism
exception, which was enacted twenty years later.
Admittedly, the D.C. Circuit, in Cicippio-Puleo,held that neither the Flatow Amendment,
nor section 1605(a)(7), nor the two provisions considered in tandem provided a statutory
right of action against foreign state defendants."5 Here, I am contesting that part of the
court's holding that denies the existence of a federal statutory right of action expressly
contemplated by the grant of jurisdiction in section 1605(a)(7). I argue that the jurisdictional
grant itself provides a statutory right of action, as plaintiffs must defaao demonstrate the
necessary elements for liability in tort in order to establish jurisdictions6
Although the availability of a statutory right of action under section 1605(a)(7) may be
contestable, common law claims have traditionally provided the basis for actions pursuant
to the other enumerated exceptions of the FSIA. Furthermore, there is no law to suggest
that common law claims would not be applicable to the state-sponsored terrorism exception
(although raising a common law claim would arguably be redundant, given the demonstration of the elements of tort required to establish jurisdiction)., 7 Accordingly, the second
half of this section examines the potential sources of common law, their relationship to one
another, and their relative strengths and weaknesses in this context of civil suits against
foreign state defendants.
83. See Joel Mendal Overton, II, Will the Real FSIA Choice-of-Law Rule Please Stand Up? 49 WASH. & LEE L.
REv. 1591, 1593 (1992) [hereinafter Overton].
84. The closest parallel in the FSIA is the non-commercial, or domestic tort exception of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1605(a)(5) which provides jurisdiction against foreign states when "money damages are sought against a
foreign state for personal injury or death, or damage to or loss of property, occurring in the United States and
caused by the tortious act or omission of that foreign state or of any official or employee of that foreign state
while acting within the scope of his office or employment [with a set of delineated torts that are NOT included
under this exception]." 28 U.S.C § 1605(a)(5) (2002). The domestic tort exception, unlike the state sponsored
terrorism exception, does not specify the specific torts that must give rise to liability (although it does list the
torts that do not give rise to the exception). Thus, in seeking jurisdiction under section 1605(a)(5), plaintiffs
do not have to allege the specific nature of the foreign state's tortious acts, and there is no limitation of the
class of possible torts to malum in se torts where breach is presumed. Id.
85. See supra
note 18 and accompanying text.
86. See, e.g., Smith v. Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, 262 F.Supp.2d 217, 226-27 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (outlining
the five elements that must be proven to state a cause of action under the Flatow Amendment which are the
precise same elements contained within § 1605(a)(7)).
87. Cicippio-Puleo v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 335 E3d 1024, 1036 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (finding that plaintiffs
were entitled to remand after the court dismissed their first complaint filed against Iran under the Flatow
Amendment so that they might seek relief under "some other source of law, including state law."); see supra
note 20 and accompanying text.
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STATUTORY CLAIMS CONTAINED WITHIN THE JURISDICTIONAL GRANT

It is uncommon, but not unheard of, for rights of action to be read directly into grants
of jurisdiction." In section 1605(a)(7), the right of action-to seek money damages for

personal injury or death against the responsible foreign state-is expressly provided in the
text of the statute.89 Although the argument can be made that the Flatow Amendment
represents an implicit legislative intent to deny the remedy explicitly provided in section
90
1605(a)(7), through the substitution of an alternative narrower remedy, this argument fails.
As argued above, both the text and the legislative history of the Flatow Amendment indicate
that the provision was added to expand options available for plaintiffs under section
1605(a)(7), not to contract them."
The text of section 1605(a)(7) delineates five prerequisites that must be met before foreign
states are stripped of sovereign immunity under section 1605(a)(7)-prerequisites that are
not present in other FSIA exceptions. 9 Unlike the other provisions, which are largely focused on the jurisdictional requirements to establish sufficient contacts with the United
States 9 but provide less detail on the elements of potential claims, section 1605(a)(7) delineates all the requisite elements for an action in tort.
Duty and breach of duty are provided at both the general and the specific level. First,
the requirement that the foreign state be designated by the State Department as a statesponsor of terrorism provides an initial threshold breach of the terrorist state's duty with
respect to other nations. Arguably, this threshold breach of duty results from crossing some
line of behavior that withdraws the protection of sovereign immunity presumptively pro-

88. One example can be found in the line of admiralty cases governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1) (1948) ("The
district courts shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States, of... [a]ny civil case of

admiralty or maritime jurisdiction, saving to suitors in all cases all other remedies to which they are entitled.");
seealso Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 -U.S. 448 (1957) (jurisdictional statute permitting judicial explication of federal common law).
89. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
90. Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 19 (1979) ("Yet it is an elemental canon of
statutory construction that where a statute expressly provides a particular remedy or remedies, a court must be
chary of reading others into it.").

91. See supra Part UI.B.
92. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7)-(a)(7)(B)(ii) (First, a claim for money damages not covered by the commercial
activity exception must be sought for "personal injury or death ... caused by an act of torture, extrajudicial
killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage taking, or the provision of material support or resources.., for such an act."
Second, the "act or provision of material support" must be "engaged in by an official, employee, or agent of

such foreign state while acting within the scope of his or her office, employment, or agency." Third, the
Secretary of State must have designated the defendant state as a "state sponsor of terrorism" either "at the time
the act occurred" or as "a result of [the] act." Fourth, either the claimant or the victim must have been "a
national of the United States ... when the act upon which the claim is based occurred." And fifth, if "the act
occurred in the foreign state," the claimant must afford the defendant "a reasonable opportunity to arbitrate
the claim in accordance with accepted international rules of arbitration.").
93. Price v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 294 E3d 82, 90 (D.C. Cit. 2002) ("mhe original
statute's immunity exceptions 'prescribe[d] the necessary contacts which must exist before our courts can
exercise personal jurisdiction.' H.R. Rep. No 94-1487, at 13 (describing the Act's personal jurisdiction provisions as a kind of federal long-arm statute ... When Congress passed the original FSIA, it was assumed that
the exercise of personal jurisdiction over foreign states under the statute always would satisfy the demands of
the Constitution ... Indeed as some courts have noted, the nexus requirements imposed by the original FSIA
sometimes exceeded the constitutional standard.") (some internal citations omitted).
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vided through international law principles of comity.94 At the specific level, the statute limits
claimants to (U.S.) victims of a small subset of the universe of imaginable terrorist actstorture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, and hostage-taking, all of which are clearly
defined crimes, or malum in se torts (and therefore per se breaches of duty) both under U.S.
law and in international agreements.9" The elements of harm and causation are also specified
and therefore must be proven before immunity is abrogated and jurisdiction granted. Additionally, suits are limited to those seeking money damages for personal injury or death
caused by the listed terrorist acts. Further support for an express right of action is provided
by the fact that the state-sponsored terrorism exception, unlike the other exceptions to
immunity in the FSIA, has its own statute of limitations set forth in a separate provision of
the FSIA. This statute of limitations provision was drafted before the enactment of the
Flatow Amendment and only applies to actions brought pursuant to section 1605(a)(7) or
96
the Flatow Amendment.
Thus, for jurisdiction to lie under section 1605(a)(7)-and prior to the triggering of the
second clause of section 1606 that "foreign state[s] shall be liable in the same manner and
to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances,"97-plaintiffs must
essentially argue their primafacie tort case: duty, breach, causation, and harm. The findings
of Verlinden-made with respect to general jurisdictional requirements that did not include
the specific elements of the claims at issue-that the FSIA "governs the types of actions
for which foreign sovereigns may be held liable"9 and requires the application of detailed
federal law standards99 thus apply afortiorito the state-sponsored terrorism exception which
details all the elements of the tort claim as part of the jurisdictional requirement.im
Moreover, the clear purpose behind the passage of section 1605(a)(7) was to allow American citizens to bring civil actions against foreign state sponsors of terrorism. 0 1 Where
federal courts have declined to find a private right of action in other statutes because of
foreign policy concerns, their reasons were based on the fact that such private suits would
run counter to the statutory purpose, as well as diminish needed uniformity in the sphere

94. See Lee M. Caplan, State Immunity, Human Rights, andJus Cogens: A Critiqueofthe Normative Hierarchy
Theory, 97 Am.J. INT'L L. 741 (2003) (arguing that the 1996 amendments to the FSIA do have a well-grounded
justification in international law based on principles of the withdrawal of comity privileges (as opposed to
dignity rights), and summarizing the existing debate among international legal scholars as to the relationship
between state sponsored human rights violations and abrogation of foreign sovereign immunity) [hereinafter
Caplan]; accord Verlinden B.V v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 486 (1983) ("foreign sovereign immunity is a matter of grace and comity on the part of the United States, and not a restriction imposed by the
Constitution.").
95. See e.g., Anti-Terrorism Act of 1991, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2331-2332(e); Hague Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Dec. 16, 1970,22 U.S.T. 1641, T.I.A.S. No. 7192; United Nations: Draft
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 23 I.L.M.
1027 (1984), modified, 24 I.L.M. 535 (1985).
96. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(f).
97. 28 U.S.C. § 1606.
98. Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 496-97.
99. Id. at 493-94.
100. The D.C. Circuit's recent discussion of the jurisdictional requirements under section 1605(a)(7) in the
case ofKilburn v. Socialist People'sLibyanArahbamhiriya,376 E3d 1123, 1127-29 (D.C. Cit. 2004), is illustrative
of how the jurisdictional inquiry can collapse into a substantive tort law inquiry, which in that case, was with
respect to the delineation of the appropriate causation standard. The court did, however, make the disclaimer
that "the only issue before us here isjurisdictionalcausation."Id. at 1129 (emphasis in original).
101. See supra notes 41-48 and accompanying text.
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°
of foreign affairs.1 2 While recognizing that "it would be imprudent for a court to create

rights of action that might interfere with the conduct of foreign policy,"'0 3 the proposed
right of action under the state-sponsored terrorism exception to the FSIA is itself the instrument of foreign policy that has been expressly endorsed by Congress. Therefore, concerns raised by other courts about judicially recognized private rights of action unduly
interfering with foreign policy in the context of statutes such as the Export Administration
Act, 10 4 the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 10 or the Hostage Taking Act, 106 are inapposite
to the FSIA context. In the FSIA context, the judicial forum is clearly provided by the
statute, and, particularly with respect to section 1605(a)(7), private litigation against foreign
state defendants was envisioned by Congress as the necessary (and sole) means of furthering
the statutory purpose.
In sum, section 1605(a)(7) is more than a mere jurisdictional statute that "speak[s] to the
power of the court rather than to the rights or obligations of the parties." 0 7 Indeed, the
state-sponsored terrorism exception speaks expressly to the rights of U.S. victims of international terrorism to bring suit against foreign states that have breached their obligations
under international law through systematic sponsoring of acts of terrorism. As such, section
1605(a)(7) should be construed to directly confer a private right of action for U.S. citizens
that have been injured by state-sponsored acts of terrorism to bring suit against the foreign

states responsible for their injuries.
B. CoMmoN LAw CLAIMS
Even if adherence to the formal structure of the FSIA dictates treating section 1605(a)(7)
as a mere grant of jurisdiction-notwithstanding its substantive law content-relief is still
available against foreign state defendants when the conditions of the state-sponsored terrorism exception are met. As has traditionally been the case for the other enumerated
exceptions to foreign sovereign immunity contained within the FSIA, common law claims
may be brought pursuant to the state-sponsored terrorism exception's grant of jurisdiction
against foreign state defendants. s Potential sources for such claims include domestic (state)
1°9
tort law, customary international law, and federal common law.

102. See, e.g. Smith v.Regan, 844 F.2d 195, 198 (4th Cir. 1988) (refusing to imply a right of action under
the Hostage Act (22 U.S.C. § 1732 (1982)) in favor of missing Vietnam veterans, finding that the act puts a
duty only on the President, and that "as different courts address these issues, the judiciary may speak with
multiple voices in an area where it is imperative that the nation speak as one."); see also Lamb v. Phillip Morris,
Inc., 915 E2d 1024, 1029 (6th Cir. 1990) (refusing to find an implied right of action under the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act (FCPA) on the basis that an antitrust private right of action would contravene rather than support
the FCPA, where the "legislative scheme clearly evinces a preference for compliance in hieu of prosecution.").
103. Israel Aircraft Indus. Ltd. v. Sanwa Bus. Credit Corp., 16 F.3d 198, 202 (7th Cir. 1994) (declining to
imply a right of action in a suit by an Israeli corporation against a Japanese bank for violation of the Export
Administration Act's anti-boycott provision, in part on the basis that it might interfere with State Department
efforts to enlistJapanese aid in brokering Mideast peace accords).
104. Id.
105. Lamb, 915 F.2d at 1029.
106. Smitb, 844 E2d. at 198.
107. Landgrafv. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 274 (1994).
108. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
109. It may fairly be deemed hair-splitting to differentiate between judicial interpretation of section
1605(a)(7) to contain an express private right of action and judicial interpretation of section 1605(a)(7) as a
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In an action against a foreign state defendant brought pursuant to the FSIA, "there is no
clear understanding as to whether the forum state's choice-of-law rules should apply or
whether federal common law should govern."" 0 The potential for confusion is even greater
with respect to claims brought pursuant to the state-sponsored terrorism exception, as the
conduct at issue occurred extraterritorially, and choice-of-law doctrine that applies to other
provisions of the FSIA may not be readily transferable.' In assessing liability for standard
domestic tort or breach of contract claims, courts interpreting the FSIA have often applied
state law as the substantive law for liability determinations, and section 1606 has been read
to dictate choice of law in a manner consistent with similar language in the Federal Tort
Claims Act.' 2
While the application of state tort law has a certain historical lineage under the FSIA,
nonetheless, that choice-of-law rule is disputed in "standard" FSIA claims." Moreover, it
is especially inappropriate to apply state tort law for liability determinations under section
1605(a)(7) given the inadequacy of domestic tort law, or "garden variety municipal tort[s],"
to encapsulate the international law aspects of the torts in question and thereby to serve as
4
a "placeholder for [the] values" at stake in the kind of wrongs covered by section 1605(a)(7).1
Furthermore, equity concerns for similarly situated plaintiffs, the inappropriateness of stim-

grant of jurisdiction which allows federal common law claims. Nonetheless, and at the risk of some repetition,
I present the two issues separately. The relative merits of federal common law as opposed to state law and
international law is better argued as a separate issue from that of the force of the substantive content in section
1605(a)(7) (which is applicable both to the reading of an express statutory right of action and to the ease of
crafting federal common law in this context).
110. Dumont v. Saskatchewan Gov't Ins., 258 E3d 880, 886 (8th Cir. 2001) (quoting 14A CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, & EDwARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3662, p. 231 (3d
ed.1998)); see also Overton, supra note 83 (documenting how the FSIA fails to establish explicit choice-of-law
rules for determining what rules to apply to substantive issues and describing divergence of opinion between
the Ninth and the Second Circuit as to whether to apply federal common law or state choice of law rules in
determining which substantive law to apply in wrongful death claims brought pursuant to the commercial
activity exception (section 1605(a)(2)).
111. See, e.g., Liu v. Republic of China, 892 F.2d 1419 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that choice of law under the
domestic tort exception, section 1605(a)(5), operates much like the Federal Tort Claims Act, and normally
applies the tort law of the state where the injury occurred).
112. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1606 ("As to any claim for relief with respect to which a foreign state is not
entitled to immunity under section 1605 or 1607 of this chapter, the foreign state shall be liable in the same
manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances; but a foreign state except for
an agency or instrumentality thereof shall not be liable for punitive damages"), with The Federal Tort Claims
Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1976) ("The United States shall be liable, respecting the provisions of this title
relating to tort claims, in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances, but shall not be liable for interest prior to judgment or for punitive damages."); see also First Nat'l City
Bank v. Banco para el Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611, 622 n. 11 (1983) (Justice O'Connor noted
the identical language, interpreting it to mean that "where state law provides a rule of liability governingprivate
individuals, the FSIA requires the application of that rule to foreign states in like circumstances" (emphasis
added)).
113. Overton, supra note 83, at 1592-93, rm. 12-15.
114. See Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 E Supp. 162, 183 (D. Mass. 1995) ("reading 118 U.S.C.] § 1350 as essentially a jurisdictional grant only and then looking to domestic tort law to provide the cause of action mutes the
grave internationallaw aspect of the tort, reducing it to no more (or less) than a garden-variety municipal tort.
This is not merely a question of formalism or even of the amount or type of damages available; rather it
concerns the proper characterization of the kind of wrongs meant to be addressed under § 1350: those perpetrated by bostis
humanigeneris('enemies of all humankind') in contravention ofjus cogens (peremptory norms
of international law). In this light, municipal tort law is an inadequate placeholder for such values").
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ulating forum-shopping with respect to a statute designed to further a national purpose,
s
and the longstanding preference for uniformity in the foreign affairs sphere" suggest the
under the
of
the
claims
need for uniform standards of liability grounded in the substance
FSIA. Such uniformity will help ensure that the ability of plaintiffs to recover will vary
according to the degree of their injuries or the culpability of the defendant, rather than
differ arbitrarily according to the local laws that apply where suit is filed or the plaintiff is
6
domiciled. "
Even when courts think that they are applying state law in determining liability under
section 1605(a)(7), they are arguably crafting federal common law as can be illustrated by
7
the D.C. Circuit's recent decision in Bettis v. Islamic Republic of Iran." In interpreting
section 1606's stipulation that "a foreign state shall be liable in the same manner and to the
same extent as a private individual under like circumstances," the Bettis court found that it
lacked a "free-wheeling commission to construct common law as we see fit. Rather, we are
bound to look to state law in an effort to fathom the 'like circumstances' to which 28 U.S.C.
' s
§ 1606 refers. The statute instructs us to find the law, not to make it."
In Bettis, the D.C. Circuit found itself bound to treat the issue of tort liability of a statesponsor of terrorism to a private individual within the confines of section 1606, and there9
fore turned to state law to provide the standards for the substance of the tort law claim."
The D.C. Circuit ignored the fact that there is no state tort law regarding tort recovery
for international terrorist acts of torture and hostage-taking, and also ignored that the
Supreme Court had already found the implicit mandate of section 1606 to apply state law
inapposite when state law was silent to the matter at hand. 20 Courtesy of"an extraordinary
survey of the common law of intentional infliction of emotional distress, with a chart showing the law in every state in which the tort has been elucidated," the court concluded that
no state law case had ever permitted nieces or nephews to recover for third-party intentional
infliction of emotional distress.12 ' Although "mindful that state-sponsored terrorist groups
... transgress all bounds of human decency through the physical and psychological torture
of their hostages," the D.C. Circuit held that "[a]s the law now stands, the nieces and
nephews of a victim have no viable basis for a third-party claim of intentional infliction of

115. American Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 123 S.Ct. 2374, 2386 (2003) (citing Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 427, n. 25 (1964)) ("There is, of course, no question that at some point an exercise
of state power that touches on foreign relations must yield to the National Government's policy, given the
'concern for uniformity in this country's dealings with foreign nations' that animated the Constitution's allocation of the foreign relations power to the National Government in the first place").
116. See, e.g., In re Air Crash Disaster at Boston, Mass. July 31, 1973, 399 F. Supp. 1107 (D. Mass. 1975)
(applying wrongful death statutes of the decedents' domiciles to determine liability for individual claims with
resulting discrepancies in the ability of similarly situated plaintiffs to recover).
117. Bettis v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 315 F.3d 325 (D.C. Cir. 2003). The issue in Bettis was whether or
not nieces and nephews of a victim of terrorism sponsored by Iran could recover for intentional infliction of
emotional distress under the Flatow Amendment. The court did not reach the issue, later decided in CicippioPuleo, of whether or not the Flatow Amendment furnished the basis for a cause of action against a defendant
state; instead the case was resolved through the application of tort law principles rendering it unnecessary for
the court to reach the cause of action issue, as plaintiffs could not recover under tort law. Id. at 330.
118. Id. at 338.
119. Id.
120. First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco para el Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611, 622 n. 11 (1983).
121. Bettis, 315 E3d at 336.
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emotional distress under the statute."' 2 The court therefore affirmed the judgment of the
lower court denying relief."3
The Bettis court's decision to "find the law, not to make it," despite its disavowal of federal
common law, can itself be seen as an act of federal common-law making, albeit masked by
the specific facts of the case. The fifty-state survey of the relevant tort law found no states
that would have allowed the plaintiffs to recover in "like circumstances." This made the
court's "decision" easy, and in effect clouded the fact that a decision had been made at all.12
But, what if one state, or ten, had allowed nieces and nephews to recover for third-party
intentional infliction of emotional distress? Then the court would have had to make a
substantive decision whether to apply the minority or majority view in creating a federal
rule to govern liability under the statute. The court would thereby engage in the process
of federal common-law making aptly described by Justice Jackson: "apply[ing] the traditional common-law technique of decision and ...draw[ing] upon all the sources of the
common law ... appropriate to effectuate the policy of the governing Act.""2 ' The Bettis
decision is thus a federal common law wolf in state law sheep's clothing; in effect, the D.C.
Circuit crafted a uniform body of law applicable for use in deciding claims under a federal
statute. That the state law precedent "binding" the court turned out to be uniform does
not negate the court's apparent willingness to engage in a process of crafting one rule out
126
of fifty-that itself constitutes common-law making.
As an alternative to state tort law, customary international law, while potentially solving
the uniformity problem as well as recognizing the gravity of the torts at issue, is nonetheless
problematic in providing a freestanding source for private rights of action under section
1605(a)(7). The amorphous content of customary international law,y 7 and the lack of any
consensus in the courts, or the scholarly literature, that customary international law can,
by its own force, create private duties against foreign states engaged in public acts, serve to
undermine its utility in furnishing a private right of action.'

122. Id. at 338 (The court concluded that the nieces and nephews were neither direct victims under § 46(1)
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, nor immediate family members under § 46(2)).
123. Id. at 325.
124. Moreover, the panel did not formally articulate the reasoning behind its threshold decision, to apply
neither the tort law of the plaintiffs' home state, nor that of the venue for filing, nor the tort law of Iran. In
effect, that initial choice to attempt to craft a standardized rule from state tort law had already moved the court
into the process of crafting federal common-law.
125. D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 472 (1942) (Jackson, J., concurring).
126. In Cicippio-Puleo, the D.C. Circuit did not reach this issue of the implications of divergent state tort
law (in that case, for whether or not immediate family members could recover for intentional infliction of
emotional distress when not "present" at the scene of the hostage-taking in question), because they upheld the
dismissal of the claim for failure to state a cause of action under the Flatow Amendment. However, in a 50
state survey of tort law done by Amicus Curiae Georgetown Appellate Litigation Clinic, it was documented
that 10 out of 50 states did in fact waive the presence requirement. Brief for the Georgetown Appellate Litigation Clinic as Amicus Curiae to the Republic of Iran at 30, Cicippio-Puleov. Islamic Republic of Iran, 353 E3d
1024 (D.C. Cit. 2004) (No. 02-7085).
127. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary InternationalLaw as FederalCommon Law:
A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARv. L. Rov. 815, 839-842 (noting the differences between traditional
CIL and the "new CIL," with the latter less tied to state practice, subject to more rapid development, and
increasingly willing to ignore traditional boundaries of national sovereignty) [hereinafter Bradley & Goldsmith];
Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 E2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (concurring opinion of Judge Bork on
amorphous nature of customary international law).
128. Compare Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, The CurrentIllegitimacy ofInternationalHuman Rights
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The fact that customary international law does not, of its own force, provide a private
right of action to be brought under section 1605(a)(7) does not deprive it of relevance in
this context. In crafting substantive rules of liability under the federal common law, courts
29
can draw on international law as a source for inspiration. In FirstNational City Bank, the
Supreme Court took precisely this approach, drawing equally upon international law principles and those of domestic law to determine that Cuba should be liable for the actions of
its instrumentality, despite its independent juridical status. 30
Similarly, in the first case brought after the 1996 amendments to the FSIA, Aljandre v.
Republic of Cuba, survivors of U.S. citizens who were killed when the Cuban Air Force shot
down their airplane over international waters as they were carrying out a humanitarian
mission sought to recover money damages for the killings under section 1605(a)(7) and the
Flatow Amendment. The court justified the imposition of punitive damages (there levied
pursuant to the cause of action provided in the Flatow Amendment) with invocation of
international law principles, finding that the "ban on extrajudicial killing ... rises to the
level ofjus cogens, a norm of international law so fundamental that it is binding on all
members of the world community."''
Although it is beyond the scope of this paper to engage fully in the debates regarding
32
the relationship between customary international law and federal common law, or the
33
relationship between foreign sovereign immunity and human rights, it is nonetheless
worth mentioning that the state-sponsored terrorism exception has made it "easier" for
courts to incorporate customary international law by expressly delineating the violations
which ensure the grant of jurisdiction and clearly waiving foreign sovereign immunity in

Litigation, 66 FoRnH.m L. Rtv. 319 (1997), with Gerald L. Neuman, Sense and Nonsense About Customary
InternationalLaw: A Response to ProfessorsBradley and Goldsmith, 66 FoRHAm L. REv. 371 (1997); see also,Jordan
J. Paust, The Other Side of Right: Private Duties Under Human Rights Law, 5 Hajv. HUM. RTs. J. 51 (1992)
(arguing that some human rights instruments demonstrate the existence of private duties).
129. Doe v. Unocal Corp., 2002 WL 31063976 at *27-29 (9th Cir. 2002) (Reinhardt,J., concurring in part)
("It is important to recognize that there is a distinction between substitutinginternational law for federal common law and making proper use of international law as part of federal common law. Employing federal common
law does not force courts to ignore a constructive or helpful rule adopted under international law, because in
appropriate circumstances federal common law incorporates relevant principles of international law [citation
omitted] ... Thus, the benefits of the vast experience embodied in federal common law as well as any useful
international law principles are obtained when we employ the traditional common law approach followed by
federal courts. Those benefits are lost, however, when we substitute for the wide body of federal authority and
reasoning, as the majority does here, an undeveloped principle of international law promulgated by a recentlyconstitute ad hoc international tribunal.").
130. First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco para el Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611,621 (1983).
131. Alejandre v. Republic of Cuba, 996 F. Supp. 1239, 1252 (S.D.EL. 1997).
132. This paper does not purport to resolve the debate as to the appropriate role of customary international
law in the federal courts, which is the subject of an extensive scholarly literature. See, e.g. Bradley & Goldsmith,
supra note 127; Ernest A.Young, Sorting out the Debate over Customary InternationalLaw, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 365
(2002); Daniel J. Meltzer, Customary InternationalLaw, ForeignAffairs, and FederalCommon Law, 42 V. J. INT'L
L. 513 (2002) [hereinafter Meltzer, Foreign Affairs].
133. See, e.g., Caplan, supra note 94 (summarizing the existing debate among international legal scholars as
to the relationship between state sponsored human rights violations and abrogation of foreign sovereign immunity); and David J. Bederman, Dead Man's Hand: Reshuffling Foreign Sovereign Immunities in U.S. Human
Rights Litigation, 25 GA. J. INT'L & Comp. L. 255 (1996) (finding foreign sovereign immunity the principle
problem involved in litigating international human rights claims in the courts of the United States).
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those instances.Y 4 When applying customary international law-or better, federal common
law informed by customary international law principles-to hold foreign sovereigns liable
for the specified set ofjus cogens violations within the framework of section 1605(a)(7), courts
are well within the bounds of narrowly defined congressional intent as manifested by the
plain language of the statute.
Arguing that customary international law norms should be incorporated into federal
common law causes of action somewhat puts the cart before the horse as to the availability
of federal common law claims under section§ 1605(a)(7). Here, I contend that federal common law is the preferred option for a non-statutory right of action. Federal common law
has been applied previously in the FSIA context in assessing whether the threshold juris36
35
dictional requirements are met for other provisions,' in determining choice of law rules,'
37
and in defining the parameters of liability under the state-sponsored terrorism exception.'
Unlike state tort law, federal common law is uniform in application and is also better able
to incorporate the international law principles that are inherent in the state-sponsored
terrorism exception (particularly given the details provided in the statute itself)." 8 Moreover, federal common law, unlike customary law, can clearly create binding duties in the
courts of the United States. 13 9 As observed by one federal judge with respect to the same
issue in the context of the Alien Tort Statute, federal common law is more appropriate for
the development of liability standards applicable to violation of international law than is
state tort law. 40
Under the precepts of Verlinden and Lincoln Mills, federal common law can give rise to a
right of action under section 1605(a)(7). As noted above, the language of the state-sponsored
terrorism exception sets forth the full elements of an action in tort-duty, breach, causation,
and injury.14' Given that the FSIA is a comprehensive regulatory statute with federally
protected interests that merit a uniform body of law, 42 there is no doctrinal reason why
federal common law would not be applicable under section 1605(a)(7). The Supreme Court

134. See supra note 57 and accompanying text (Previous claims brought under the FSIA for human rights
violations did not fit into any of the existing exceptions. And, now that section 1605(a)(7) has been added, only
a subset of such claims is viable only against designated state-sponsors of terrorism); note also that Congress'
careful delineation of qualifying international law violations in the FSIA context is distinct from the general
nature of the jurisdictional grant provided by 18 U.S.C. § 1350. Indeed, one of the concerns jurists have with
implying a cause of action under the Alien Tort Statute is the potentially unbounded scope of claims that might
arguably constitute violations of the "law of nations." See e.g., Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774
(D.C. Cit. 1984) (concurring opinion of Judge Bork on amorphous nature of customary international law).
135. Engle, supra note 79.
136. Overton, supra note 83, at 1592-93, nn. 12-15.
137. Karnezis, supra note 16.
138. Even Bradley and Goldsmith agree that CIL norms can be incorporated into federal law with appropriate political branch authorization. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 127, at 871.
139. See, e.g., Meltzer, supra note 132 (advocating that federal courts formulate a rule of decision called for
by federal law when interpreting statutes implicating international law-a rule "which might be state
law, CIL,
a rule borrowed from another federal statute, or a rule fashioned afresh by the court itself"); see also
supra note
129 and accompanying text.
140. Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 183 (D. Mass. 1995) ("[W]hile it may be an 'awesome duty' to
develop the liability standards applicable to international law violations through the generation of federal
common law, I do not see how ...recurrence to municipal tort law would provide an appropriate response to
the challenge").
141. Supra notes 95-100 and accompanying text.
142. Verlinden B.V v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 497 (1983).
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has not hesitated to apply "federal common law where federally created substantive rights
and obligations are at stake ...[to] avoid subjecting relevant federal interests to the inconsistencies in the laws of several States." 43 The substantive tort law content of section
1605(a)(7) readily addresses the concerns of Justice Frankfurter, who, dissenting in Lincoln
Mills, queried: "Assuming, however, that we would be justified in pouring substantive content into a merely procedural vehicle, what element of federal law could reasonably be put
into the provisions of s 301?"'

44

Verlinden's assessment of the FSIA as a comprehensive regulatory statute, codifying the
standards governing foreign sovereign immunity as an aspect of substantive federal law and
essential to the promotion of uniquely federal interests, is especially pertinent to the appropriateness of federal common law.'14 The Court's language that the FSIA "does not
merely concern access to the federal courts" but rather "governs the types of actions for
which foreign sovereigns may be held liable" 46 resonates with that of the majority in Textile
Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, where a divided Court found that the Taft-Hardey Act did
more than merely confer federal court jurisdiction over labor organizations; it actually
promoted an important federal policy as part of a comprehensive legislative scheme to
maintain peace in the labor force. 147 Under Verlinden, therefore, the door is opened not
only to the possibility of bringing state law claims directly in federal court with no diversity
constraints, but also to considering options under federal common law necessary to further
statutory purposes (as was the case with the comprehensive legislative scheme under the
Taft-Hartley Act at issue in Lincoln Mills). This judge-made law can issue without fear or
critique of self-aggrandizement, as jurisdiction is already ensured and protected by congressionally defined substantive standards.
Moreover, just as the Taft-Hartley Act aimed to channel labor dispute cases away from
unfriendly state courts, Congress "deliberately sought to channel cases against foreign sovereigns away from the state courts and into federal courts, thereby reducing the potential
for a multiplicity of conflicting results among the courts of the 50 states." 14s The predominance of foreign policy concerns in the opinion and the Verlinden Court's emphasis on the
need for uniformity in the field of foreign affairs raises the possibility that circumstances
might exist in which federal common law can be applied instead of state law-particularly
when there are no appropriate governing standards of private liability, and therefore the
implicit command of section 1606 to apply state law is inapposite. It is precisely this constellation of circumstances that the Verlinden Court found itself facing one month later in

143. City of Milwaukee v.111.& Mich., 451 U.S. 304, 336 (1981) (citing Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills,
353 U.S. 448, 456-57 (1957); United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 305 (1947); Clearfield Trust
Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366-367 (1943); D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447 (1942)).
144. Textile Workers, 353 U.S. at 478.
indicates, the primary purpose of the Act
145. Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 496-97 ("As the House Report clearly
forth comprehensive rules governing sovereign immunity,'... the jurisdictional provisions of the
was to 'se[t]
Act are simply one part of this comprehensive scheme") (internal citations omitted).
146. Id.
147. Textile Workers, 353 U.S. at 455 ("Plainly the agreement to arbitrate grievance disputes is the quidpro
quo for an agreement not to strike. Viewed in this light, the legislation does more than confer jurisdiction in
the federal courts over labor organizations. It expresses a federal policy that federal courts should enforce these
agreements on behalf of or against labor organizations and that industrial peace can be best obtained only in
that way.").
148. Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 497.
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displacing a New York rule of decision with one of federal common law in First National
City Bank v. Banco ParaEl Comercio Exterior de Cuba. 49 Citing Verlinden and Sabbatino, the
Court found that "matters bearing on the Nation's [sic] foreign relations 'should not be
' 50
left to divergent and perhaps parochial state interpretations."
Admittedly, Verlinden and First National City Bank were decisions of a Supreme Court
more willing to engage in common-law making than is the Court today. But notwithstanding statements by the Court such as Justice Scalia's in Sandoval that "[r]aising up causes of
action where a statute has not created them may be a proper function for common-law
courts, but not for federal tribunals,"' federal courts are still in the business of crafting
judge-made law. Indeed, as Justice Scalia himself acknowledged in Boyle, federal common
law is available and may be used to displace state law, in situations where "uniquely federal
interests" present "significant conflict" with state rules of decision." 2
Itis not hard to imagine a situation where state tort law of battery and wrongful imprisonment, for example, might prove inadequate to establish the requisite liability for the
claims of torture and hostage-taking allowable under section 1605(a)(7). In such instances,
whether you consider state law "silent" on the matter at hand, as did the Supreme Court
in First National City Bank, or presenting "significant conflict" with the "uniquely federal
interests" of section 1605(a)(7) in providing U.S. citizens with an effective weapon to use
against outlaw states, application of federal common law is warranted.
In Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, the Supreme Court expressly found that the "door is still ajar
subject to vigilant doorkeeping" for the crafting of federal common law through "independent judicial recognition of actionable international norms."'53 In that case, the jurisdictional provision at issue, the Alien Tort Statute, provided district courts jurisdiction over
"tort[s] only, in violation of the laws of nations,""14 and the relevant issue was whether or
not the limited federal judicial power, post-Erie, encompassed the authority to define the
content of what might constitute a modem-day violation of the law of nations.' In the
case of the terrorism exception to the FSIA, the statute itself defines the acts that give rise
to jurisdiction. Congress has defined, within this particular context, the "narrow class of
international norms" which, if violated, give rise to jurisdiction under the statute. Justice

149. First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco para el Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611,622 n. 11,623 (1983)
("Bancec also contends alternatively that the FSIA, like the FTCA, requires application of the law of the forum
State-here New York-including its conflicts principles. We disagree." The court also notes: "IThe principles governing this case are common to both international law and federal common law, which in these
circumstances is necessarily informed both by international law principles and by articulated congressional
policies.").
150. Id. at 622 n. 11.
151. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 287 (2001); Cannon v.Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 732 (1977)
(Powell, J., dissenting) (Justice Powell observed that the earlier, more liberal, implied cause of action doctrine
hinged on the pre-Erie freedom of federal courts to act as common-law courts in creating substantive standards
of liability).
152. Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 507-08 (1988) (Federal common law can be used to
substitute for the state rule of decision when there is both a "uniquely federal interest" and "a 'significant
conflict' exists between an identifiable 'federal policy or interest and the [operation] of state law,'. . .[a]
conflict
with federal policy [which] need not be as sharp as that which must exist for ordinary pre-emption when
Congress legislates 'in a field which the States have traditionally occupied."') (internal citations omitted).
153. Sosa v. Alvarez Machain, 124 S.Ct. 2739 (2004).
154. Id. at 2747.
155. Id.
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Scalia's concern regarding independent judicial recognition of actionable international
norms 56 is thus not present when the federal judiciary crafts common law under section
1605(a)(7)-Congress has already specified which norms are actionable. Rather, the judicial
power in this context is exercised only to provide needed uniformity in a sphere of "uniquely
federal interests."
Moreover, the need for uniform federal law-be it an express statutory right of action
contained within section 1605(a)(7) or the crafting of federal common law to bring claims
pursuant to that grant of jurisdiction-takes on an added force in the context of suits against
state-sponsors of terrorism. In Verlinden, the Court acknowledged that the FSIA allowed
plaintiffs to file claims in state courts, but also emphasized that "[i]n view of the potential
sensitivity of actions against foreign states and the importance of developing a uniform
body of law in this area," the statute guarantees removal from state to federal courts at the
5 7
request of the foreign state defendant. However, this guarantee of removal is inoperative
when the foreign state defendant defaults, as is typical of many of the actions brought under
5s
The argument for the application of federal
the state-sponsored terrorism exception.
rather than state law is therefore even stronger in situations where the statute's removal
59
guarantee is ineffectual due to the non-appearance of the foreign state defendant. Absent
the removal guarantee, uniformity is lost in a context where state courts can only hear state
law claims. If federal law is applicable, then even if the suit is heard in state court, the states
are presumably bound by federal court interpretations of that law. The asserted importance
of a uniform body of law in the context of suing state sponsors of terrorism, however, hinges
on the predicate argument that the same (or heightened) concerns about the sensitivity of
foreign policy and need for uniformity are present with respect to actions against designated
state-sponsors of terrorism as are present with respect to actions against foreign states with
60
whom the United States has cordial diplomatic relations.

156. Id. at 2764.
157. See Verlinden B.V.v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 489-90 (1983).
158. For example, all the cases cited in note 15, supra,including the Cicippio-Puleocase, were default judgment
cases.
159. The only state court case to yet hear a claim under section 1605(a)(7) has been a New York Surrogate
Court: In re Estate of Weinstein, 712 N.Y.S.2d 300, 301-02 (N.Y. Sur., 2000) ("The sole asset of decedent's
estate is his claim against Syria pursuant to FSIA § 1605(a)(7) ...Since FSIA provides for jurisdiction in either
the state or federal courts for a claim brought pursuant to FSIA § 1605(a)(7), a state court would have jurisdiction to hear claimants' case against Syria.").
160. Recent experience with the lifting of certain economic sanctions against Libya (who nonetheless remains
on the State Department's official list of state-sponsors of terrorism) in light of the country's cooperation
regarding weapons of mass destruction, apology for the destruction of Pan Am Flight 103, and offer to pay
of moving towards cordial relationships
$10 million to each of the victim's families indicates that the possibility
always is hovering in the background, and therefore that the need for uniform standards regarding civil law
suits is present in order to facilitate such restored diplomatic relationships. See, e.g., Glenn Kessler, U.S. Opens
Door to Business with Libya; Bush Says Easing of Sanctions Rewards Cooperation on Banned Weapons, WAsH. POST,
Apr. 24, 2004, at A14. Indeed, lack of uniform treatment of all United States victims of Libyan terrorism may
actually stall progress in normalizing relations. See Robert S. Greenberger, U.S. Overture Toward Libya Faces
Hurdle, WALL ST. J., Apr. 23, 2004, atAl 3 (describing opposition of victims of April 1986 bombing of La Belle
discotheque to lifting of sanctions against Libya, and their attempts to seek a settlement similar to that provided
to the Pan Am families before sanctions are lifted).
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IV. Conclusion: Judicial Responsibility to Effectuate
Jurisdiction
The fact that the judicial power comprehends recognition of federal claims against statesponsors of terrorism under section 1605(a)(7) provides no guarantee that the judiciary will
choose to recognize such suits. Apparent opposition by the Executive branch to suits against
state-sponsors of terrorism,'16 the special deference afforded to the Executive branch in the
field of foreign affairs,162 the Supreme Court's increasing reluctance to engage in expansive
interpretations of remedial statutes, 63 and the existence of an alternative (albeit less than
equally effective) remedy under the Flatow Amendment are all factors suggesting that the
jurisdictional grant against foreign state defendants qua states provided in the state-sponsored
terrorism exception may never be given its full effect absent a crystalline statement from
Congress. Such a clear statement rule would shift the "burden of inertia"M to Congress in
this highly charged political arena to more forcefully redraft legislation in an area that the
16
D.C. Circuit has already recognized as reflecting a "delicate legislative compromise."' 1
There are strong reasons, however, why the judiciary should not force Congress' hand
in such a way. Foremost among these is the inherent fairness of fulfilling the statutory
promise of section 1605(a)(7) by allowing litigants to present their claims (as defined in the
very text of the statute) against the terrorist states responsible for their injuries. 6Moreover,
absent federal law with the power to displace state law, suits against foreign sovereigns who
are designated state-sponsors of terrorism are still "open ground" for state law claims given
the explicit grant of jurisdiction in section 1605(a)(7). Ironically, if the judiciary does defer
to the Executive branch and declines to endorse the existence of a federal cause of action,
such judicial inaction could itself set the stage for a proliferation of state law claims that
would presumably be more disruptive to foreign policy than any judge-crafted federal law.
At issue, therefore, is who decides the boundaries of foreign state liability in giving effect to
the jurisdictional grant against foreign state sponsors of terrorism under section 1605(a)(7)state judges or federal judges.
It seems clear that "a statute passed by Congress and signed by the President obviously
1 67
stands on a different footing than a representation to the Court by the Executive branch."
While the statutory text of section 1605(a)(7) has the democratic imprimatur of the bicam-

161. See Cicippio-Puleo v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 353 E3d 1024, 1030-31 (regarding the court's request
for the appearance of the United States as Amicus Curiae, summarizing the U.S. position in the case of Roeder
v. Islamic Republic of Iran, that the Flatow Amendment does not create a cause of action against foreign states,
a posture that was then reiterated, and elaborated to exclude official capacity suits against state actors as well,
in their filing in the Cicippio-Puleocase).

162. See, e.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936) (noting the "very
delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the President as the sole organ of the federal government in the field
of international relations-a power which does not require as a basis for its exercise an act of Congress.").

163. See generally Daniel J. Meltzer, The Supreme Court'sJudicialPassivity, 2002 Sup. CT. REv. 343 (2002)
[hereinafter Meltzer,Judicial Passivity]; Judith Resnik, ConorictingRemedies: The Rebnquist Judiciary,Congress,
and FederalPower, 78 IND. L.J. 223 (2003) [hereinafter Resnik].
164. See Daniel J. Meltzer, State Court Forfeituresof FederalRights, 99 HAzv. L. REv. 1128 (1986).
165. Price v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 294 F.3d 82, 89 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
166. See Meltzer, Judicial Passivity, supra note 163; Resnik, supra note 163.
167. See Carlos Manuel Vazquez, W(h)ither Zschernig, 46 VILL. L. REv. 1259, 1267 n. 58 (2001); see also
Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298, 328 (1994) (distinguishing between unrealized aspirations of the Executive branch and the law as it currently stands to find that a California corporate tax affecting
multinational enterprises is not preempted by the dormant foreign commerce clause).
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eral passage and presentation requirements of article I, Executive branch filings in specific
cases are subject to shifting political winds with little or no democratic accountability or
legislative transparency. 68 The preference of the Executive branch may well be for section
1605(a)(7) to become nugatory, as reflected by its interventions in litigation to date. However, on the presumption that the provision is not void, the choice (absent a statutory cause
of action that is interpreted to give full effect to the jurisdictional grant) is between judgemade law at the federal level, that "which in these circumstances is necessarily informed
9
or reliance
both by international law principles and by articulated congressional policies,"16
170
upon state tort law claims that are poorly suited to the cases at issue.
There are strong policy arguments on either side regarding the desirability of allowing
7
private litigation against foreign state sponsors of terrorism. ' If the Executive branch wants
accountable way through
a
democratically
done
in
be
it
should
then
statute,
the
to repeal
the introduction of new legislation rather than through piecemeal attack in the courts.
Indeed, such piecemeal interventions arguably run counter to the recognized purpose of
the FSIA to depoliticize actions against foreign sovereigns and "assur[e] litigants that...
decisions [regarding the conditions under which foreign sovereigns are amenable to suit in
the courts of the United States] are made on purely legal grounds and under procedures
that insure due process."' 72 Unless and until the Congressional authorization for civil suits
against foreign state sponsors of terrorism is repealed through the legislative process, the
judiciary has a duty under article III of the Constitution to interpret the grant of jurisdiction
under section 1605(a)(7)-and the substantive rights and obligations that it creates-so as

to give the law its uniform and full effect.

168. Compare Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 E2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (and specifically the U.S. Memorandum
asAmicus Curiaein same (reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 585 (1980))), with the position of the United States inAlvarezMachain v. Sosa, Brief for the United States as Respondent Supporting Petitioner filed in Sosa v. AlvarezNo. 03-339.
Macbam, Et al.
169. First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco para el Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611, 623 (1983).
notes 114-116 and accompanying text.
170. See supra
notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
171. See supra
172. Verlinden B.V v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 488 (1983) (citing H.R. REP. No. 94-1487,
at 7 (1976)).
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